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1 
Absolute Publishing Power and Bulletproof Immunity: 
How Section 230 Shields Internet Service Providers from 
Liability and Makes It Impossible to Protect Your 
Reputation Online 
Victoria Anderson* 
 “Good name in man and woman, dear my lord, Is the 
immediate jewel of their souls: Who steals my purse 
steals trash; ‘tis something, nothing; ‘Twas mine, ‘tis 
his, and has been slave to thousands: But he that filches 
from me my good name Robs me of that which not 
enriches him, And makes me poor indeed.”1 
INTRODUCTION 
Although written hundreds of years ago, this quote from Othello still 
rings true in the twenty-first century because human nature has largely 
remained the same. Human beings still place great importance on the 
perceived reputation of others when choosing who to associate with. A bad 
reputation can mean lost business opportunities and friendships. 
Additionally, humans still have the tendency to act out of spite and tarnish 
the reputation of others, sometimes through spreading false information. 
The recognition of these truths as to the nature of humanity is why 
libel laws have existed for so long. The tort of defamation has long pre-
existed the creation of the United States (we borrowed the concept from 
English common law) because of the inevitability of its occurrence and the 
level of harm it can do to a person,2 despite its tension with First 
Amendment values. Each generation has had varying levels of success 
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 1. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, OTHELLO act 3, sc. 3, l. 160–66.  
 2. Van Vechten Veeder, The History and Theory of the Law of Defamation, 3 COLUM. L. 
REV. 546, 566 (1903). 
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reconciling this tension. Unfortunately, in the twenty-first century we have 
allowed modern systems of communication to distract us from the 
importance of this necessary balance. 
Today, as more of our communications move online, the potential 
damage that defamation can have on an individual’s reputation can be 
severe.3 Internet defamation is widespread, difficult to fully correct or 
retract, and oftentimes made with complete anonymity.4 The Internet’s 
reach is unlike any form of communication in history. However, a victim 
of online defamation has far fewer options for legal recourse than a person 
who is defamed in the physical world, even though the damage has the 
potential to be far greater. 
The lack of legal recourse afforded to victims of online defamation 
is due to the way Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act 
(Section 230) is written and construed. Section 230 immunizes Internet 
Service Providers (ISPs) from liability for limiting or restricting access to 
objectionable material and prevents ISPs from being treated as original 
publishers of information they did not create but appears on their 
platforms.5 The scope of immunity reflected in judicial decisions since its 
enactment basically amounts to blanket immunity—any liability for third-
party content is prohibited.6 For example, if a person is defamed on 
Facebook, only the original content creator is liable for defamation. Even 
if Facebook knew the content was defamatory and did not remove it, as an 
ISP it is completely immune from liability for the content’s defamatory 
character.7 
Despite this prevailing interpretation, there is another way to 
interpret Section 230 that is more consistent with traditional defamation 
law. The alternative interpretation leaves open the possibility of imposing 
distributor liability on ISPs and users who transmit defamatory content. In 
other words, the language of Section 230 suggests the potential for ISPs to 
be categorized as distributors, holding them liable if they know or have 
reason to know of defamatory content on their platform. Therefore, in the 
above hypothetical regarding Facebook, liability could be imposed if a 
 
 3. See, e.g., Kashmir Hill, A Vast Web of Vengeance, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 2, 2021), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/30/technology/change-my-google-results.html/ 
[https://perma.cc/Z4AM-NM9M]. 
 4. See id. 
 5. Jeff Kosseff, The Lawsuit Against America Online That Set Up Today’s Internet Battles, 
SLATE (July 14, 2020), https://slate.com/technology/2020/07/section-230-america-online-ken-
zeran.html [https://perma.cc/CEB4-U2YY]; see also 47 U.S.C. § 230; see also VALERIE C. BRANNON 
& ERIC N. HOLMES, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R46751, SECTION 230: AN OVERVIEW 8 (2021). 
 6. See Kosseff, supra note 5; see also BRANNON & HOLMES, supra note 5, at 11. 
 7. See Kosseff, supra note 5; see also BRANNON & HOLMES, supra note 5, at 14–15. 
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plaintiff can prove that Facebook had knowledge of the defamatory 
content and then failed to take reasonable action. 
This Note contends that under current interpretations of Section 230, 
there is little to no accountability for online defamation, thus Congress 
should consider amending Section 230 and removing contradictory 
language, so victims of defamation can hold ISPs accountable for 
defamatory content that they do not reasonably investigate and remove. 
Victims of online defamation should be permitted a legal path forward as 
opposed to the blind alley created by the current interpretation of Section 
230. Part I of this Note discusses the history and importance of defamation 
laws. Part II explores how courts have applied Section 230 in online 
defamation cases and how current interpretations of the statute create a 
barrier for victims of defamation. Finally, Part III recommends novel 
Section 230 interpretations and amendments that provide victims of 
serious Internet defamation legal recourse. 
I. HISTORY AND IMPORTANCE OF DEFAMATION LAWS 
A. The Conflict Between Free Speech and Defamation 
The importance of an individual’s reputation formed the basic notion 
of the tort of defamation. An individual’s reputation “[i]n the 
communitarian view . . . is the image of the individual created and held by 
others.”8 Therefore, “defamation was seen as an attack . . . on the very 
essence of the self.”9 Defamation laws in America had to be balanced with 
an individual’s right to free speech.10 As indicated in the U.S. Bill of 
Rights: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom 
of speech, or of the press.”11 In the United States, freedom of speech was 
(and is) considered to be paramount to protect citizens from a strong 
central government.12 
However, despite the apparent tension between defamation laws and 
freedom of speech, libel was maintained as common law tort.13 In essence, 
defamation was designed to effectuate society’s “pervasive and strong 
 
 8. M. M. Slaughter, The Development of Common Law Defamation Privileges: From 
Communitarian Society to Market Society, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 351, 352 (1992). 
 9. Id. at 353. 
 10. David L. Hudson Jr., Libel and Slander, THE FIRST AMEND. ENCYCLOPEDIA (May 14, 2020), 
https://mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/997/libel-and-slander [https://perma.cc/9DLE-4BGG]. 
 11. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 12. See Andrew T. Kenyon, What Conversation? Free Speech and Defamation Law, 73 MOD. 
L. REV, 697, 701 (2010). 
 13. Hudson, supra note 10. 
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interest in preventing and redressing attacks upon reputation.”14 The 
continued existence and enforcement of defamation laws indicates that 
protecting reputation is still considered relevant in sustaining a lawful 
society, which accords respect to every individual. In fact, defamation law 
shares a common principle with freedom of speech: the inherent value of 
the individual. Freedom of speech under the First Amendment reflects the 
importance of one’s ability to voice his opinion to “further a search for 
truth, further the operation of democracy or self government, and further 
the development of autonomous subjects or individual liberty.”15 
Defamation laws reflect the value of one’s right to protect his reputation 
among his peers and recognize the damage that false, published statements 
can do to an individual.16 
B. A Brief Explanation of Defamation Laws 
To be considered defamatory, a statement must cause others to view 
the subject of the statement unfavorably. According to the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts, “[a] communication is defamatory if it tends . . . to 
harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the 
community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with 
him.”17 This does not mean the majority of the community must react to 
the individual unfavorably, but only that the defamatory statement has a 
negative impact on his reputation among a substantial number of people 
in the community.18 Traditionally, a prima facie defamation claim 
included the following three elements: (1) a false and defamatory 
statement concerning another; (2) published to a third party without 
privilege; and (3) the publication harms the plaintiff.19 
The level of responsibility one has for sharing defamatory content 
depends on how the law classifies the sharer—as a publisher or 
distributor.20 These legal distinctions are based on the presumed level of 
control each classification has over the published materials.21 For instance, 
primary publishers—such as a newspaper or magazine publisher—face 
strict liability for defamatory content because they have more editorial 
 
 14. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86 (1966). 
 15. Kenyon, supra note 12, at 701. 
 16. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 558, 559, 577 (AM. L. INST. 1977); see also 
Michelle J. Kane, Blumenthal v. Drudge, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 483, 485 (1999). 
 17. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (AM. L. INST. 1977). 
 18. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §559 cmt. e (AM. L. INST. 1977). 
 19. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §558 (AM. L. INST. 1977). 
 20. Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1101 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 21. Amanda Groover Hyland, The Taming of the Internet: A New Approach to Third-Party 
Internet Defamation, 31 HASTINGS COMMC’NS. & ENT. L.J. 79, 96 (2008). 
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control.22 They “can be held liable for defamatory statements contained in 
their works even absent proof that they had specific knowledge of the 
statement’s inclusion.”23 “Primary publishers that republish false 
statements are usually held to the same standard of liability as the original 
author of the statement.”24 Conversely, a distributor—such as a bookstore, 
newspaper stand, or a Facebook user who shares a post—may face liability 
for content they did not create when they transmit it.25 Distributors are 
presumed to be passive conduits of information and include entities that 
have little or no control over what they republish.26 If classified as a 
distributor, one will only be held liable if they knew or had reason to know 
that the third-party material transmitted was defamatory.27 This standard 
provides shelter for entities that cannot screen the content they distribute 
because of the knowledge requirement. 
C. Online Defamation Before Section 230 
The aforementioned classifications of ISPs yielded contradictory 
results prior to the enactment of Section 230. The two cases prompting 
Section 230’s enactment, Cubby v. CompuServe28 and Stratton Oakmont 
v. Prodigy,29 yielded entirely different results. 
In Cubby, CompuServe, an online library, was not held liable for 
defamatory statements because it did not know the statements at issue had 
been published on their forum.30 Subscribers to CompuServe had access 
to forums.31 The “Journalism Forum” focused on the journalism industry 
and was managed by Cameron Communications, Inc. (CCI).32 CCI 
contracted with CompuServe to “‘manage, review, create, delete, edit and 
otherwise control the contents’ of the Journalism Forum ‘in accordance 
with editorial and technical standards . . . as established by 
CompuServe.’”33 The plaintiffs alleged that the defamatory statements at 
issue were published as part of the Journalism Forum carried by 
 
 22. Id. at 97. 
 23. Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997) (citing W. PAGE KEETON, DAN 
B. DOBBS, ROBERT E. KEETON, & DAVID G. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 
113, at 810 (5th ed. 1984)). 
 24. Hyland, supra note 21, at 96–97. 
 25. See Jae Hong Lee, Note, Batzel v. Smith & Barrett v. Rosenthal: Defamation Liability for 
Third-Party Content on the Internet, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 469, 471 (2004). 
 26. Hyland, supra note 21, at 97. 
 27. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581(1) (AM. L. INST. 1977). 
 28. Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
 29. Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 031063/94, 1995 WL 323710, at *1 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995). 
 30. Cubby, 776 F. Supp. at 139–41. 
 31. Id. at 137. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
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CompuServe; therefore, CompuServe should be classified as a publisher 
of the statements.34 CompuServe moved for summary judgement and 
asserted “that it acted as a distributor, and not a publisher, of the 
statements, and cannot be held liable for the statements because it did not 
know and had no reason to know of the statements.”35 Because 
CompuServe did not manage the content itself, the court characterized 
CompuServe as a distributor; therefore, any liability would have to be 
based on knowledge it had of the defamatory posting.36 Since the plaintiff 
could not show that CompuServe had the requisite knowledge to impose 
distributor liability, the court granted CompuServe’s motion for summary 
judgment and held that it was not liable for the defamatory posting.37 
In Stratton Oakmont, the trial court reached the opposite conclusion. 
In that case, Prodigy, a computer network with subscribers communicating 
over bulletin boards, was sued for defamatory statements posted on a 
board titled “Money Talk.”38 The plaintiffs claimed that Prodigy was a 
publisher and could be held to a stricter standard of liability39 for the 
defamatory statements because it “exercised editorial control over the 
content of messages posted on its computer bulletin boards,” and actually 
“held itself out” as asserting editorial control.40 The court ultimately 
agreed with the plaintiffs without departing from the holding in Cubby. 
The court distinguished Stratton Oakmont from Cubby in two ways: 
“[f]irst, P[rodigy] held itself out to the public . . . as controlling the content 
of its computer bulletin boards. Second, P[rodigy] implemented this 
control through its automatic software screening program . . . .”41 The 
court saw the use of the software as “actively utilizing technology and 
manpower to delete notes . . . on the basis of offensiveness and ‘bad 
taste,’ . . . [as Prodigy was] clearly making decisions as to content, and 
such decisions constitute editorial control.”42 These actions placed Prodigy 
in a unique position as a publisher; thus, the court held that Prodigy was 
liable for the defamatory postings.43 
 
 34. Id. at 138. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 140–41. 
 37. Id. at 141. 
 38. Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 031063/94, 1995 WL 323710, at *1 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995). 
 39. See Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997) ( “Publishers can be held 
liable for defamatory statements contained in their works even absent proof that they had specific 
knowledge of the statement’s inclusion.”). 
 40. Stratton Oakmont, 1995 WL 323710, at *2. 
 41. Id. at 4. 
 42. Id. 
 43. See id. at 4–5. 
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II. THE ENACTMENT OF SECTION 230 
The decisions in Cubby and Stratton Oakmont became known by two 
U.S. representatives, Chris Cox (R-CA) and Ron Wyden (D-OR), who 
introduced Section 230 as part of the Communications Decency Act 
(CDA).44 Their concern was that Stratton Oakmont “seemed to punish a 
well-intentioned effort to provide a ‘family-oriented’ computer service.”45 
By enacting Section 230, Congress hoped “to overturn the result in 
[Stratton Oakmont by removing] any disincentives for ISPs to police their 
service for offensive content.”46 This was accomplished in two parts of the 
statute. First, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) reads: “No provider or user of an 
interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of 
any information provided by another information content provider.”47 The 
plain reading of this statutory language indicates that “§ 230 creates a 
federal immunity to any cause of action that would make service providers 
liable for information originating with a third-party user of the service.”48 
Essentially, courts cannot allow claims that regard computer service 
providers as publishers.49 Any of these services that make editorial 
decisions about what to keep up or remove from their platform will be 
immune from liability.50 Thus, Section 230(c)(1) overturns the result in 
Stratton Oakmont by allowing ISPs to keep defamatory content up without 
fault. 
Second, Congress used Section 230(c)(2) to protect ISPs that monitor 
and screen content. That section reads: 
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held 
liable on account of—(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith 
to restrict access to or availability of material that the provider or user 
considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, 
 
 44. Ashley Johnson & Daniel Castro, Overview of Section 230: What It Is, Why It Was Created, 
and What It Has Achieved, ITIF (Feb. 22, 2021), https://itif.org/publications/2021/02/22/overview-
section-230-what-it-why-it-was-created-and-what-it-has-achieved [https://perma.cc/7KUS-22CZ]; 
see also Lee, supra note 25, at 473. 
 45. Lee, supra note 25, at 473. 
 46. Id. 
 47. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). An “information content provider” is defined in Section 230(f)(3) as 
“any person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of 
information provided through the Internet or any other interactive computer service.” 47 U.S.C. § 
230(f)(3). In contrast, an “internet service provider” (ISP) is the medium on which the content is 
distributed, not the creator of the content itself. ISPs are eligible for immunity according to the plain 
reading of Section 230. See BRANNON & HOLMES, supra note 5, at 11–12. 
 48. Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997). 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
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harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is 
constitutionally protected ….51 
Section 230(c)(2) essentially gives ISPs the power to regulate content 
in good faith without worrying about First Amendment lawsuits. With the 
continuing threat of impending lawsuits, Congress was concerned that new 
Internet companies would not achieve the same level of growth.52 
The purposes of Section 230 are listed in the statute itself.53 Most 
importantly, Section 230 includes the following: preserving the free 
market as it currently exists;54 promoting the “continued development of 
the Internet and other interactive . . . media”55; and encouraging “the 
development of technologies which maximize user control.”56 
A. Online Defamation After Section 230: Zeran v. AOL 
An early judicial decision chose to read Section 230 broadly. Zeran 
v. America Online, Inc. reflects the later trends of judicial decisions, 
despite being wrought with controversy. Essentially, Zeran created “a kind 
of immunity with no offline parallel.”57 
In Zeran, the plaintiff sued America Online (AOL) for unreasonable 
delay in “removing defamatory messages posted by an unidentified third 
party.”58 The post at issue advertised t-shirts relating to the recent 
Oklahoma City bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Building.59 The t-shirts 
included phrases such as: “Visit Oklahoma . . . It’s a BLAST!!!” and 
“Finally, a day care center that keeps the kids quiet—Oklahoma 1995.”60 
The post instructed those interested in the shirts to call “Ken” and included 
the plaintiff’s phone number.61 This distasteful prank caused the plaintiff 
to receive angry and derogatory messages, as well as death threats.62 At 
one point, he received an abusive call every two minutes.63 Once the 
plaintiff informed AOL about what was going on, the post was removed.64 
However, a similar post resurfaced shortly after, and the calls began 
 
 51. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A). 
 52. Zeran, 129 F.3d at  330. 
 53. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(b). 
 54. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2). 
 55. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(1). 
 56. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(3). 
 57. JAMES GRIMMELMANN, INTERNET LAW: CASES AND PROBLEMS 196 (10th ed. 2020). 
 58. Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 328 (4th Cir. 1997). 
 59. Id. at 329. 
 60. Kosseff, supra note 5. 
 61. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 329. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
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flooding in once again.65 AOL frequently assured the plaintiff that they 
were handling the issue, but according to the plaintiff there was a 
significant delay in any action taken.66 As a defense to this suit, AOL 
invoked Section 230 and moved for summary judgment.67 
The plaintiff in Zeran argued that Section 230 immunity did not 
extend to distributor liability, and an ISP like AOL could be held liable if 
they had specific knowledge of the statement’s defamatory nature.68 The 
plaintiff pointed out that “distributor” takes on a different legal meaning 
than “publisher,” 69 and “publisher” is the only phrase included in Section 
230(c)(1).70 Therefore, the plaintiff asserted that Section 230 does not 
protect distributors, and AOL could be considered a distributor “like 
traditional news vendors or book sellers,” thereby warranting liability 
because AOL had the requisite knowledge of the defamatory post and 
failed to act.71 
The court of appeals affirmed the district court’s decision to grant 
AOL’s motion for summary judgment for three main reasons.72 First, the 
court reasoned that AOL fell “squarely within [the] traditional definition 
of a publisher.”73 Quoting W. Page Keeton, the court stated that “[e]very 
one who takes part in the publication . . . is charged with publication.”74 
Therefore, the court reasoned that even if AOL could be classified as a 
distributor, it was still a type of publisher because it had the choice of 
whether to “publish, edit, or withdraw the posting.”75 From the court’s 
perspective, the plaintiff was trying to impose liability upon AOL for 
exactly what Section 230 protects it from: imposition of liability on an 
Internet service provider for statements made by another information 
content provider.76 
Second, the court reasoned that the plaintiff’s interpretation was 
inconsistent with the original policies behind the law. According to the 
court, imposing notice liability “reinforces service providers’ incentives to 
 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 331. 
 69. Id. 
 70. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (“No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be 
treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content 
provider.”). 
 71. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331. 
 72. Id. at 328. 
 73. Id. at 332. 
 74. Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 332 (4th Cir. 1997) (citing W. PAGE KEETON, DAN 
B. DOBBS, ROBERT E. KEETON, & DAVID G. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 
113, at 799 (5th ed. 1984)). 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 333. 
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restrict speech,”77 which has a “chilling effect on the freedom of Internet 
speech.”78 Additionally, the court reasoned that the plaintiff’s 
interpretation “would deter service providers from regulating” offensive 
content for fear of facing distributor liability.79 
Finally, the court reasoned that this interpretation would create a 
flood of lawsuits resulting in an impossible burden for ISPs.80 The court 
stated that the plaintiff’s interpretation would defeat the law’s policy of 
encouraging the development of the Internet and new technologies 
because ISPs could not continue to grow in the face of endless lawsuits.81 
After Zeran, courts dealing with Section 230 defamation claims have 
largely agreed with Zeran’s holding. In fact, this broad interpretation of 
Section 230 was stretched to its farthest possible lengths in Blumenthal v. 
Drudge.82 In that case, the court granted summary judgment to AOL even 
though AOL contracted and paid for the allegedly defamatory gossip 
column that was at issue in the case.83 Unlike Zeran, where the posts were 
written by anonymous users, the posts in Drudge were written by 
identifiable Internet users. Yet, the court still refused to impose liability 
even though the ISP in that case promoted the problematic content and 
paid the original content-creator.84 
In practical effect, Zeran created a three-part inquiry: 
(1) is the defendant an ‘interactive computer service’ within the 
meaning of Section 230; (2) does the plaintiff’s cause of action treat 
the defendant as a publisher; and (3) was the content at issue in the 
suit ‘provided by another information content provider?’ If a 
plaintiff’s cause of action against a website or other computer service 
treats that service as a publisher of third-party-created-content, the 
defendant will be immune from liability—end of story.85 
B. Lingering Questions in a Post-Zeran World 
After the court decided Zeran, the plaintiff, Kenneth Zeran, began 
advocating for a change in the law. He believes that the right approach is 
to treat “all platforms as distributors . . . providing them with protections 
until they are notified of the allegedly illegal user content.”86 According to 
 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44 (D.D.C. 1998). 
 83. Id. at 53. 
 84. Kane, supra note 16, at 483. 
 85. Gregory M. Dickinson, An Interpretive Framework for Narrower Immunity Under Section 
230 of the Communications Decency Act, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 863, 868 (2010). 
 86. Kosseff, supra note 5. 
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Zeran, “he never would suggest that platforms have an obligation to 
proactively detect illegal content; rather, they should be able to handle 
complaints and remove harmful content after being notified.”87 
Specifically, Zeran contends that “[t]he operative word isn’t monitoring or 
filtering . . . [i]t’s response.”88 
Zeran is justified in questioning the outcome of his case because it 
led to troubling policy questions and conflicts. Perhaps the most obvious 
is that the Zeran interpretation of Section 230 immunity is a license for 
bad actors to spread defamatory information. The Zeran decision demands 
no personal responsibility for those who act with intention, particularly 
because the statute provides user immunity.89 Users are situated differently 
than ISPs in substantial ways that do not align with the holding in Zeran. 
Individual users are not faced with the task of monitoring a large volume 
of third-party content; rather, they are only tasked with regulating 
themselves. Additionally, users may be more likely than ISPs to actively 
engage in malicious propagation of defamatory or offensive material and 
bear personal responsibility for the content they distribute. 
An additional concern with continuing to adhere to the holding in 
Zeran is the rapidly evolving nature of the Internet, which has grown out 
of “its infancy . . . into a vigorous and muscular adolescent.”90 The 
Internet is a different medium than it was when Congress enacted Section 
230 and when the court decided Zeran twenty-four years ago. The policies 
which were adhered to in the 1990s are arguably out of touch with the state 
of the Internet today. For example, the drafters of Section 230 worried 
about ISPs being able to monitor massive amounts of content.91 However, 
today ISPs have the ability to do this, mostly through notification systems 
that are employed by users.92 These systems allow users to flag content 
that goes against the platform’s established guidelines.93 ISPs hire 
individuals, who serve as “fact checkers,” to monitor content as well as 
remove potentially misleading or false information.94 These new realities 
demonstrate that responding to user concerns over defamatory material is 
no longer an impossibility for ISPs. While the Internet has “continue[d] to 
serve as a valuable facilitator of free expression . . . it has now become 
 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (“No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be 
treated as the publisher . . . .”). 
 90. Lee, supra note 25, at 491. 
 91. Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997). 
 92. See, e.g., How Our Fact-Checking Program Works, FACEBOOK JOURNALISM PROJECT (Aug. 
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such a robust and integral part of modern life that it can safely be subjected 
to at least minimal regulation.”95 
Moreover, Section 230 is premised on the notion that Internet speech 
deserves special protections because the Internet is a special forum for the 
exchange of robust and diverse ideas.96 However, the courts and Congress 
have not sincerely questioned the truth of this proposition. Why is Internet 
speech special? Why do ISPs deserve more rigid protections than 
publishers in the non-virtual world when Internet defamation can cause 
even more damage to the victim?97 This is perhaps another example of 
how notions about the Internet in the 1990s no longer reflect the state of 
the Internet today. 
Surprisingly, despite the policy decision to protect ISPs from 
liability, ISPs are given explicit permission to remove content as they see 
fit. This permission is granted in Section 230(c)(2) and allows ISPs to act 
as a publisher and remove content for any reason as long as they perceive 
it to be “objectionable.”98 This provision of Section 230 seems to render 
(c)(1) superfluous. “If providers who choose to censor third-party-created 
content are already immune under subsection (c)(1) because the content is 
not their own, then what can be the purpose of subsection (c)(2), which 
grants immunity if they choose to censor?”99 This provision poses more 
questions than it solves problems for three reasons. First, the statute 
imposes a “good faith” standard on the provider or user, as well as a 
subjective standard of what they consider to be “obscene, lewd . . . or 
otherwise objectionable.”100 This part of the law maximizes ISP control of 
their platforms to take down what they please, completely at their 
discretion, which could undeniably have the effect of “chilling” Internet 
speech. This seems completely contrary to at least two of the statute’s 
stated goals: maximizing user control and maintaining robust Internet 
speech.101 Second, ISP liability is not consistent with how they are treated. 
Section 230(c)(2) explicitly gives ISPs publisher-like editorial control, 
while (c)(1) bars their treatment as publishers. Third, as part of the CDA, 
these sections read together are contrary to the stated goals of the Act.102 
The original goal was to shield minors from harmful material on the 
Internet.103 Congress sought to achieve this by criminalizing “the 
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‘knowing’ transmission of ‘obscene or indecent’ messages.”104 In contrast, 
Section 230 immunizes ISPs when they leave up offensive material.105 
Those who advocate for maintaining Section 230 as it is written 
would say that (c)(2) solves part of the Stratton Oakmont dilemma.106 In 
that case, the court held Prodigy liable for the defamatory content on its 
bulletin board because it placed itself into the role of a publisher by 
actively screening messages.107 The decision in Stratton Oakmont 
provided a disincentive to others like Prodigy to filter any content for fear 
of litigation. Section 230(c)(2) hopes to prevent this same result by 
allowing self-regulation. Congress wanted to encourage ISPs to self-
regulate at their own liberty without worrying about First Amendment 
claims.108 However, (c)(2) does nothing to protect defamed individuals. 
Why would an ISP self-regulate if there were no consequences (under 
(c)(1)) should it decide not to? Market forces could arguably motivate an 
ISP to remove objectively obscene content that the average user would not 
want to see (such as grotesque images or language) but might not motivate 
them to remove content that defames one individual. Without the threat of 
a lawsuit, an ISP has nothing to lose by keeping the material online; why 
would it waste its time with removal? 
III. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
There is a myriad of problems with the current status of Section 230 
which cannot be remedied with a one-size-fits-all solution. Before any 
type of reform takes place, the legislature must reexamine what general 
policy goals should be prioritized going forward, given what we know 
about the Internet today. Is the main goal to maximize user control and 
protect Internet speech at all costs, defamation victims be damned? If so, 
(c)(2) must be reconsidered because of the power it gives ISPs to control 
speech. Conversely, Congress could attempt to balance the interests of free 
speech and defamation, as lawmakers and courts have attempted to do 
throughout history. That is a much more sensible policy solution, 
especially given what we know about how much damage the Internet can 
do to one’s reputation. 
There are many solutions that can be implemented to better align 
Section 230 with traditional defamation laws, Section 230’s original 
policy goals, and the Internet policies lawmakers should be pursuing. This 
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Note offers four possible changes to Section 230 to achieve these goals: 
first, interpreting Section 230 narrowly; second, revising Section 230(c)(2) 
so that holistically, the entire law is more consistent with the original 
policy goals of promoting robust Internet speech and maximizing user 
control; third, revising Section 230 to impose user liability; and finally, 
imposing ISP liability using the Digital Millennium Copyright Act as a 
model. 
A. A Narrower Construction 
The interests of defamation victims can be balanced with original 
Section 230 policies by changing the way the law is currently interpreted 
to include distributor liability. The original policies include preserving the 
free market as it currently exists;109 promoting the “continued 
development of the Internet and other interactive . . . media”110; and 
encouraging “the development of new technologies which ‘maximize user 
control.’”111 This can be accomplished without any changes to the 
language of the statute. Currently, broad immunity is granted to ISPs, 
whereas a different reading could attach significance to the fact that the 
word “distributor” is not included in the language of Section 230.112 Under 
a narrower construction, if courts find distributors are not included under 
Section 230, distributors would be liable based on the knowledge they had 
about the defamatory posting at the time. This interpretation is completely 
plausible because of its consistency with common law, which recognizes 
a legal distinction between publishers and distributors.113 In fact, Congress 
could have been aware of this distinction when it drafted Section 230. 
There is no need to assume, as the court in Zeran did, that the underlying 
desire to protect the First Amendment was also supposed to totally 
sacrifice the competing value of defamation laws,114 especially because an 
alternate interpretation is entirely plausible: distributors should not be 
included within this broad immunity because they do not fall under the 
umbrella term of a “publisher.”115 
If this interpretation prevails, the result in Zeran would have been 
more satisfactory. In that case, despite the plaintiff continuously notifying 
AOL of the online harassment he was experiencing, AOL was able to 
escape liability for allowing online defamation because of Section 230 
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protections.116 Under a narrower construction, if the court characterized 
AOL as a distributor, it would be liable based on the knowledge it had 
about the defamatory posting at the time. AOL employees acquired this 
knowledge when the plaintiff notified them about the problematic posts.117 
The plaintiff would have well deserved recourse in a situation in which it 
was clear he was being defamed anonymously with AOL being the only 
avenue for restraining the problem. 
Additionally, the result in Cubby would remain undisturbed. In that 
case, CompuServe contracted with a separate entity to monitor its platform 
and thereby did not know or have reason to know of any of the defamatory 
postings at issue.118 Under this proposed interpretation, because 
CompuServe would not have the requisite knowledge required to be 
classified as a liable distributor, it would not have been liable.119 
The main objection to a narrower construction of Section 230 
immunity is that the result in Stratton Oakmont would be the same, but 
Congress enacted Section 230 to overturn that decision. However, this is 
not necessarily true. In Stratton Oakmont, the court held that because 
Prodigy represented itself as controlling the content on its message boards, 
it was liable as a publisher of the defamatory information.120 If the case 
was decided in a post-Section 230 world while applying a narrower 
interpretation, it is possible that Prodigy would have been granted Section 
230 immunity because it would still be classified as a publisher, not a 
distributor. Prodigy was determined by the presiding court to be a 
publisher because it publicly represented itself as controlling the content 
on its message boards, thereby accepting the highest degree of editorial 
control and the highest standard of liability.121 Thus, Congress’ initial 
concerns about Stratton Oakmont are not reasons against a narrow 
construction because even under a narrower construction of Section 230 
allowing for distributor liability, Prodigy would not be liable because of 
their classification as a publisher, which is explicitly immunized in the 
language of Section 230.122 
However, it would be a mistake not to mention the potential 
problems with a narrower construction, especially as it relates to Stratton 
Oakmont.  It may not be fair to compare that case with Zeran, which is an 
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ethically clearer case. In Zeran, the defamatory posting served little First 
Amendment value—it was a prank which contained demonstrably false 
information resulting in extreme harassment.123 However, in Stratton 
Oakmont, the opposite is true. The postings in that case accused others of 
criminal behavior and lying, 124  which (if truthful) does have value in 
becoming public knowledge. Furthermore, a narrower construction in a 
case that is more similar to Stratton Oakmont could lead to puzzling 
results: why should a publisher who retains more editorial control over 
content be subjected to immunity, whereas distributors with less control 
can face liability if they have the requisite knowledge? Such an 
interpretation could also prompt every ISP to either clearly establish 
themselves as publishers and be granted immunity or shield themselves 
from any knowledge about what is posted to avoid distributor liability, 
thereby inhibiting any incentives it may have had to engage in self-
policing. 
These are valid concerns that would render a narrower construction 
essentially useless. However, ISPs already have no incentive to self-police 
when it comes to a defamed individual, as seen in Zeran.125 Under Section 
230(c)(1), nothing will happen to an ISP if it does not act because it will 
not be treated as the “publisher or speaker” of the defamatory 
information.126 Additionally, if an ISP classified as a distributor 
intentionally shields itself from having knowledge, it may still be liable if 
there were reason to know of a post’s defamatory nature.127 The “reason 
to know” standard could prevent ISPs from intentionally ignoring posts 
because in certain situations, an ISP may still have reason to know about 
defamatory content (such as in Zeran where the plaintiff had notified AOL 
of the problem), which would subject it to liability despite not having 
actual knowledge.128 This standard and market forces—which will 
encourage ISPs to invoke some level of content moderation in order to 
attract and obtain user traffic—will prevent ISPs classified as distributors 
from intentionally ignoring postings to avoid liability. The market will not 
allow an ISP to plead ignorance if the goal of an ISP is to run a profitable 
Internet service, and in turn ISPs cannot claim ignorance when they have 
reason to know. 
Additionally, Congress can justify imposing notice liability on 
distributors while granting publishers immunity. If the goal is to encourage 
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self-policing and minimal government interference, that encouragement 
could be realized by not faulting ISPs who participate in this type of 
monitoring for some instances that get overlooked, assuming it has made 
a good faith effort. A distributor, on the other hand, has much less 
responsibility and can better monitor content since it is only required to 
act if something is specifically brought to its attention. Judicial discretion 
could be applied in these situations: the more responsibility an ISP takes 
on in self-policing, the more generous a judge should be in excusing 
mistakes made in good faith. If the ISP takes a more hands-off approach, 
it will be expected to investigate and act reasonably when notified because 
it has not already taken matters into its own hands. 
A. Reconsidering and Revising Section 230(c)(2) 
Another suggested solution is a revision to Section 230(c)(2). This 
section is puzzling when compared to (c)(1) because it contradicts what is 
arguably the most important policy behind Section 230: maintaining 
robust Internet speech.129 While (c)(1) does not treat an ISP as a publisher 
or speaker of third-party content, (c)(2) allows them to act as publishers 
by allowing them to remove content they find to be “obscene, lewd, 
lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise 
objectionable.”130 The issue with the wording of (c)(2) is the catchall 
phrase, “otherwise objectionable.”131 This essentially gives ISPs 
publisher-like power over third-party content, while (c)(1) prevents them 
from facing legal culpability for their content, thereby giving ISPs the 
ability to control the free flow of information. The amount of control ISPs 
have under (c)(2) could have other downstream impacts on speech in a 
free society. For example, ISPs could have a strong influence “on shaping 
independent thought, market access, consumer behavior, election 
integrity and speech . . . . In a very real way, these platforms are 
transforming the nature of what it means to be ‘free’ in a free society.”132 
The more companies that engage in moderating behaviors, the more 
we move away from the original policy behind the law: ensuring true 
diversity in Internet discourse.133 Giving ISPs this privilege in conjunction 
with Section 230(c)(1) allows them to be gatekeepers without legal 
accountability. As such, policymakers should remove the contradicting 
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language in Section 230(c)(2) to promote Internet speech. By removing 
the term “otherwise objectionable” from 230(c)(2) and making the 
existing list exhaustive, lawmakers can limit the reasons an ISP may 
lawfully remove content. Then, an ISP can be held accountable when 
removal was not sufficiently based on one of the listed reasons. 
There are two additional reasons for amending Section 230(c)(2) that 
do not relate to defamation. First, the juxtaposition between Sections 
230(c)(1) and 230(c)(2) highlights the contradictory nature of Section 230 
in its explicit language and purported policy. This contradiction further 
shows that Congress did not intend Section 230 to fully upend common 
law. Second, there should be regulations on platforms that control such a 
large percentage of information because of the risk of drowning out other 
voices. The First Amendment becomes obsolete if that right is subject to 
the discretion of the Big Tech oligarchy. By removing the catchall phrase 
“otherwise objectionable” and maintaining an exhaustive list of content 
categories appropriate for removal, ISP control would be limited and user 
control would be maximized, resulting in protection of the right to free 
speech and a limit to ISP discretion. Furthermore, defamatory content 
should be included in that exhaustive list. 
B. Imposing Distributor Liability on Users 
A third suggestion is to remove user immunity from Section 230. The 
explicit language of Section 230 grants user immunity along with ISP 
immunity.134 The term is not defined but it has been given its common 
meaning; individuals who choose to participate in online forums.135 The 
presumed reason for its inclusion is contained in the statute itself: 
maximization of user control.136 Users should feel free to disseminate 
information from third parties, thereby empowering Internet speech.137 
While user immunity is enumerated in the statute, it is yet another 
policy contradiction when considering the justifications for Section 230 
immunity. Particularly, individual users are not comparable to ISPs under 
the analysis in Zeran. For example, the Zeran court was concerned that 
ISPs could not monitor and respond to massive volumes of third-party 
postings.138 However, users are not similarly situated because they are only 
responsible for regulating their own online behavior. Additionally, ISPs 
typically bear less responsibility for third-party content than users because 
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ISPs are more likely to distribute information passively through its users, 
whereas individual users are more likely than ISPs to act with malicious 
intent when distributing defamatory information. 
The above differences seem to indicate that users should face some 
type of legal responsibility for knowingly disseminating defamatory 
information on the Internet, just as they would in the non-virtual world. 
Section 230 as it is currently written has the potential to serve as a license 
for bad actors to knowingly and intentionally engage in this damaging 
behavior. If a user had the requisite knowledge that the content they 
distributed was defamatory, distributor liability is appropriate and should 
be imposed. 
Imposing distributor liability on users would not have a “chilling” 
effect on Internet speech because, like distributor liability in the non-
virtual world, the burden of proof for imposing distributor liability in a 
defamation case is very high. The Restatement (Second) of Torts 
establishes that a distributor “is subject to liability if, but only if, he knows 
or has reason to know of its defamatory character.”139 This standard deters 
litigants from bringing defamation suits because the burden of proof is 
substantial.140 Also, the fact-finding process in a defamation lawsuit is 
extensive and costly.141 Individual Internet users who become defendants 
in defamation cases are unlikely to have the funds to cover a judgment in 
the plaintiffs favor (especially after paying for litigation). These two 
factors prevent truly frivolous defamation suits from actually making it to 
trial and do not have a profound effect on speech. The same is true for a 
lawsuit based on Internet defamation. There will not be a lawsuit every 
time defamation occurs online for precisely the same reasons why there is 
not a lawsuit every time defamation occurs in print. 
User liability may also solve part of the dilemma faced by ISPs. If 
distributor liability deters a user from disseminating defamatory 
information, presumably there will be less defamatory content for ISPs to 
respond to. As noted earlier, users are much more likely to engage in active 
and malicious distribution of defamatory material, whereas ISPs tend to 
take a more passive role. If users are deterred with legal consequences, 
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there will theoretically be less defamatory content circulated in the first 
place. 
A legal deterrent is necessary for online users because it is vital that 
the law encourages individuals to take responsibility for their actions. As 
technology develops, and as more communications occur online, 
regulations that hold individuals responsible for online behavior become 
more necessary. Whether perpetrators are acting online or not is irrelevant 
to whether they are responsible for their actions. Therefore, imposing 
notice-based distributor liability on users of Internet services could 
reinforce this personal responsibility and prevent some online defamation 
from occurring in the first place. 
C. Imposing Distributor Liability on ISPs Using the DMCA 
Although imposition of user liability makes sense from a policy 
standpoint, it may not yield satisfactory results for the victim. If a plaintiff 
can overcome the high standard of proof and cover the costs of defamation 
litigation, a defendant who is an individual user is unlikely to have the 
funds to make a lawsuit worthwhile. Therefore, victims of online 
defamation should have some avenue of legal recourse against ISPs when 
they can meet the high standard of proof and classify the ISP as a 
distributor. 
In Barrett v. Rosenthal, the California Court of Appeals pointed out 
an interesting contrast between Section 230 immunity and another form of 
immunity granted under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA): 
The DMCA immunizes providers who transmit material that 
infringes the rights of the holder of a copyright if the provider did not 
originate the infringing content, has no editorial control over the 
material, does not know the material is infringing or have reason to 
know, acts expeditiously to remove the material after learning of the 
infringement, and receives no financial benefit from the infringing 
activity.142 
The Barrett court pointed out that liability allowed under the DMCA 
is similar to distributor liability under common law because a distributor 
is classified as someone with little editorial control over the defamatory 
material; knowledge of the defamatory nature of the material is a 
prerequisite to liability. 143 Additionally, the court stated that DMCA 
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liability might demonstrate that “Congress d[id] not feel this level of 
liability [would] unduly chill Internet communication.”144 
The DMCA is a helpful model that can be used to implement notice-
based liability on ISPs who qualify as distributors thereby making Section 
230 more consistent with common law.  “The DMCA conditions ISP 
liability for online infringement of copyright-protected works on the 
service provider’s actual or constructive knowledge of infringement.”145 
Similarly, Section 230 could be revised so that ISPs would only face 
liability when they failed to remove defamatory content based on 
sufficient notice. Therefore, the plaintiff’s burden would be to demonstrate 
that an ISP had the necessary knowledge about the defamatory content and 
still failed to take it down. 
A possible revision to Section 230 based on the DMCA could include 
a specific process on how to give the requisite notice to ISPs. Then, when 
an ISP receives notice, the ISP must act reasonably to remove the 
defamatory content, and if not, face liability. To balance First Amendment 
concerns, a process allowing the accused to defend their use of the 
allegedly defamatory content should be included in the revision. A 
common critique of the DMCA is that it “treats the fair user and the 
infringing user exactly the same way; it denies both users the opportunity 
to defend their respective uses before takedown.”146 The same critique 
could apply to a revised Section 230: someone who distributes content that 
is not defamatory would face the same legal consequences as a person 
spreading truly defamatory information. For this reason, and because of 
the particularly delicate balance between defamation and the First 
Amendment, there should be accessible options for the person defamed to 
request removal and for the person accused of defamation to contest 
removal. 
Notification systems do not place a substantial burden on ISPs 
because many already have notification systems in place that allow users 
to report certain objectionable material.147 The problem with defamation 
online is the lack of incentive ISPs have to remove it. A notification 
provision added to Section 230 would provide that incentive and allow for 
victims of defamation, who can meet the high standard of proof that 
distributor liability requires, to recover against ISPs that do not act 
reasonably after receiving notice of defamatory material on their service. 
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To avoid arbitrary removals, as Section 230 in its current form 
attempts to prevent, “reasonable action” must have a clear definition that 
is articulated in the statute itself. The term “reasonable action” still gives 
ISPs discretion to act in many forms depending on the circumstances. For 
example, if a post is not taken down immediately, an ISP can attach a 
notice to the post which reads “this post is subject to investigation because 
it possibly contains defamatory content.”148 Then, reasonable action would 
constitute conducting a good-faith investigation and making a 
determination about removal. The ISP will not face liability if it conducted 
a good faith investigation on which they based their decision, whether or 
not it removes the post. On the other hand, if the potentially defamatory 
post is removed immediately, the poster should have an avenue for 
contesting removal clearly outlined in Section 230 (as previously 
suggested).149 
Another possible revision to Section 230 is to require ISPs who fail 
to establish clear guidelines for notification and removal to follow the 
notice take down procedures outlined in a revised Section 230. This would 
allow (and encourage) ISPs to set up their own reasonable procedures for 
dealing with a complaint of defamation. An ISP will therefore become 
open to liability if they fail to establish procedures and do not abide by the 
procedures outlined in the statute, or if the plaintiff can demonstrate that 
an ISP’s established procedures are not reasonable, not followed, or 
applied improperly. This way, a victim of online defamation will have 
options and be able to bring suit whether or not an ISP decides to create 
its own guidelines for handling defamation complaints. 
CONCLUSION 
The language in Section 230 has made it difficult for a plaintiff to 
recover damages for defamatory statements made by third-party users 
online. The courts’ broad construction of Section 230 has produced 
troubling results that completely reject traditional defamation laws and 
allow bad actors to escape responsibility for their behavior online. As more 
of our communications move online, it is vital that Congress amends 
Section 230. Courts may also address these concerns by adopting a 
narrower construction of Section 230 that allows for the imposition of 
distributor liability. Additionally, Congress can change the text of Section 
230 to include distributor liability. To further clarify Section 230, 
Congress should first revise Section 230(c)(2) to dispose of contradictions 
 
 148. This is similar to the fact checking feature ISPs have recently been using. A label will 
accompany a posting that the ISP suspects contains false information, warning other users of what it 
possibly contains. 
 149. See supra pp. 26–27. 
2021] Absolute Publishing Power & Bulletproof Immunity 23 
within Section 230, thereby making the law more holistically consistent in 
promoting Internet speech. As a general policy, it is important to make 
sure ISPs take responsibility for the platforms they govern and not become 
cultural gatekeepers. Second, Congress should remove the word “user” 
from Section 230(c)(1), which would allow for the imposition of user 
liability. This change would encourage individuals to act responsibly 
online and likely eliminate much of the online defamation that occurs.  
Finally, Congress should use the DMCA as a framework for notice take 
down provisions under Section 230 and allow ISP liability based on notice. 
Each of these proposals is more consistent with traditional 
defamation laws than Section 230 in its current form. As a society, we 
should not allow modern forms of communication to complicate the 
simple notion that individuals should have avenues of recourse for 
defamation. The tort of defamation, whether it occurs online or in-person, 
should allow individuals to protect their reputation, which in turn, protects 
their mental health, livelihood, and relationships with others.  
 
